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DO U.S. FIRMS FLY HIGHER WHEN BYPASSING
THE U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS? AN INVESTIGATION OF
THE SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE OF FOREIGN IPOS
Robert N. Killins* and Peter V. Egly**

Abstract: This paper investigates the performance of U.S. firms that partake in a foreign IPO
– bypassing their domestic exchanges and raising their equity in a foreign market. The
globalization of equity markets along with the increased regulations to financial markets in the
U.S. has potentially led to the U.S. losing its title as the premier listing market. Using a sample
of 77 U.S. based firms that totally bypassed the U.S. equity markets in their capital(equity)
raising activities we are able to investigate the performance of this unique sample of firms. This
investigation contributes to the literature by finding that U.S. firms which bypassed the U.S.
market experienced less underpricing compared with U.S. only IPOs. We alsotest the window
of opportunity and prestigious underwriter IPO hypotheses on our unique data set and find
statistical evidence supporting the former hypothesis yet no statistical evidence confirming the
latter hypothesis.
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), Underpricing, Globalization, Regulation

INTRODUCTION
This study examines the pricing of foreign IPOs (FIPOs) made by U.S. companies
as compared to purely domestic offerings (DIPOs). Doidge, et al. (2013) suggests
that IPO activity in the U.S. has fallen compared to the rest of the world and U.S.
firms go public less than expected. During the past decade IPOs in the U.S. have
not kept up with the economic importance of the U.S. In the 1990s, the yearly
average of the number of U.S. IPOs comprised 26.7% of all IPOs issued worldwide
while the U.S. accounted for 27% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Since
2000, the U.S. share of all IPOs has fallen to 11.7% whereas its share of worldwide
GDP has averaged 30%. Further, The New York Times reports that 75 firms from
the U.S. choose to bypass the U.S. exchanges completely and list in a foreign market
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between 2000-2009.1 This is a strikingly upward trend from the previous decade
where only 2 U.S. companies choose to bypass U.S. exchanges.
There are three reasons why the study of FIPOs offering by U.S. firms is
important. First, as outlined above the globalization of equity markets has
transformed the capital raising activities of firms across the globe and it is important
to investigate the impact this transformation has had on equity raising activities.
Secondly, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) suggest that most of the literature focuses
on foreign firms seeking equity in the U.S. markets. We have seen a significant
number of U.S. firms bypassing the U.S. market in the past decade but little research
has been done on the performance of these firms. Finally, Kim and Weisbach (2008)
along with Caglio, et al. (2011) amongst others have investigated the determinants
of firms seeking equity outside of their home country but do not investigate firm
performance. This literature contributes to fill such gap.
We follow Wu and Kwok (2003) who examined the short-term pricing of global
IPOs made by U.S. companies and found that that global participation can
significantly reduce underpricing by about 4%. Our research differs from Wu and
Kwok (2003) in several ways. They focus on the performance of global IPOs
originating from the U.S. Our study has a unique sample which is comprised of
firms that are totally bypassing U.S. markets. Unlike global IPOs, FIPOs are exempt
from regulation from the SEC and are strictly regulated by the foreign markets
security regulators. FIPOs are also much smaller than the global IPOs which tend
to be even bigger than domestic IPOs. Also, we employ a propensity score matching
methodology that differs from the traditional matching methodology that was
employed by Wu and Kwok, (2003). Finally, our paper uses a sample period from
2000 to 2011 which captures a unique time frame during the globalization of
financial markets including new security regulation and the financial crisis of 20072008.
Using a sample of FIPOs and purely domestic IPOs made by U.S. firms from
2000 to 2011, we reveal that, FIPOs exhibit approximately 2% less underpricing
than their matched domestic counterparts. Secondly, we are able to find that FIPOs
experience less underpricing when the foreign market (U.S.) is experiencing a “hot”
market which aligns with the window of opportunity hypothesis. These
findingsadd to the evidence of the foreign clientele hypothesissuggested by Wu
and Kwok (2003) which proposes that foreign investors may be willing to pay a
premium for foreign equity. Lastly, the results do not offer statistical evidence
that underwriters prestige ranking impacts the degree of FIPO underpricing.
This research will also be of interest to academics, practitioners, and regulators.
As mentioned this research fills the academic research gap by investigating the
performance of these U.S. firms seeking equity outside of the regulation of the
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U.S. markets. Practitioners, such as potential issuers, venture capitalists, and
investment bankers, can use this research to better understand some of the options,
complications, and performance of issuing equity outside of the U.S. Lastly,
regulators globally can understand the potential impacts new regulations may
have on firms seeking to issue equity on their markets and the price performance
of such regulations.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 will provide a brief overview
of the relevant literature on IPO underpricing in a global context and provide the
hypotheses we intend to investigate. Section 3 will outline our data sources and
Section 4 describes our methodology. Section5 will consist of our results and Section
6 will provide the implications and conclusions of our research on foreign IPOs.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
IPO Market
In frictionless markets, the fundamental Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem
implies that neither the type of securities a firm issues nor the location in which
these securities are issued are relevant. However market frictions such as,
imperfectly integrated markets, taxes and market regulations render the choice of
location of stock issuance an important consideration for practitioners. Global
financial integration continues to evolve. As more countries further develop their
financial markets, firms have more options to raise capital. Further, the global
competition among financial exchanges has increased since many exchanges have
evolved into for-profit companies that need to maximize shareholders wealth. In
response to the increased competition, some larger and well established exchanges
have created new sub-exchanges such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Toronto Venture Stock Exchange
(TSX-V) by the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). These new markets were created to
allow younger and smaller firms, which may not yet meet the listing requirements
of the major markets (e.g.NYSE, LSE, TSX) to list and to have access to a wider
range of investors. These new developments have created a brand new listing
environment for corporate equity financing worldwide.
Recent literature suggests that with the globalization of equity markets and
increased international competitiveness among exchanges, the United States
exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ may be losing their place as the premier
listing destination. Globalized competition among exchanges has led to the
increased development of “global IPOs”. That is firms choosing to initiate an IPO
in their domestic market and set aside a fraction of the total shares offered to global
investors (global tranche) while the remaining shares are offered simultaneously
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in the domestic market. Zingales (2007) finds that while in the late 1990s the U.S.
capital market was attracting 48% of all the global IPOs, its share has dropped to
6% in mid-2000’s. Zingales (2007) also hints at the idea of U.S. based firms totally
bypassing the U.S. equity markets in favor of European markets but suggests that
it has only been a recent but surprisingly interesting phenomenon.
Although no one single factor has caused this shift in global IPO activity from
one market to another, new regulations in the U.S. markets may have played a
contributing role. The passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) introduced new
stringent disclosure requirements. Many researchers and shareholders suggest that
these requirements place undue hardship on firms that are required to report to
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Coates (2007) suggests that U.S.
regulation might benefit foreign companies, especially from developing countries,
as it allows them to bond themselves to better disclosure and practices, but it also
implies some costs. His empirical analysis suggests that the costs of the post-2002
changes in the regulatory environment might have exceeded the benefits for U.S.
companies.
IPO Performance - Short-term
On average, the closing market price on the first day of trading of an IPO is higher
than the offer price. In every country with a stock market, IPOs are underpriced
Ritter (2003).2 Loughran and Ritter (2004) document the changing pattern of IPO
underpricing over the modern era. They indicate that IPO underpricing in the
1980s, as measured by the average first-day return, was 7% which continuously
climbed until reaching a peak during the internet bubble where average first-day
returns reached 65%. Since then the average first day return has reverted to
approximately 12% during the period of 2002-2008.
Global IPO Performance (Short-and Long-run)
Wu and Kwok (2003) examine the pricing of global initial public offering made by
U.S. companies compared to purely domestic (U.S. only) offerings. Using a time
frame from 1986 to 1996 they obtain a working sample of 453 global IPOs and 2127
domestic IPOs. They test the foreign clientele hypothesis, which suggests that global
offerings will be less underpriced if firms allocate more shares to foreign investors
who have high demand and truthfully reveal it. The finding suggests that global
participation can significantly reduce underpricing by about four percentage points
compared to purely domestic issues which confirm the foreign clientele hypothesis.
Further, the degree of underpricing is inversely related to the relative size of the
global tranche. They attribute the lower initial returns associated with global IPOs
to the existence of a foreign clientele that are willing to pay higher prices in exchange
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for the benefit and convenience of global diversification provided by these offers.
They conclude that global issuing companies are able to take advantage of the
window of opportunity that occurs when foreign demand for U.S. shares is high
which is measured by the relative strength of the U.S. stock market compared to
other major markets. Lastly, the research by Wu and Kwok (2003) suggest that
high-rank underwriters are associated with deeper underpricing in global offerings.
They are unable to provide an explanation for such result suggesting that it could
be attributed to the different IPO methods used in foreign countries (book-building,
auction, fixed-price).
Wu and Kwok (2007) follow up their previous empirical investigation of global
IPOs with a study that focuses on the long-term performance of global offerings.
They test the window of opportunity hypothesis suggesting global issues are more
prone to investor over-optimism than purely domestic ones. Foreign investors’
interest in U.S. shares is not only affected by the fundamentals of the IPO firm, but
also affected by other factors such as the attractiveness of the U.S. stock market
relative to their national market, convenience of share ownership, and desire for
global diversification. In cross-sectional tests, global IPO firms underperform their
purely domestic counterparts in the three years after issuance. Despite the longrun underperformance, global issuers fare relatively better than their domestic
match in terms of operating performance during the same time period.
Chan, Wu et al. (2007) study the impact of global offerings on U.S. IPOs offer
price using the stochastic frontier approach. Testing the demand inelasticity,
certification effect, and investor recognition/participation hypothesis they find
that the average valuation efficiency of global offerings firms exceeds that of the
domestic offering by 3.1% points. Further, they suggest that global IPO firms are
better able to ease the price pressure if a significant portion of total shares is
allocated to the global tranche. Less reputable and risky firms benefit more from
global offerings, thanks to the certification and investor recognition effects.

Caglio, et al. (2011) examine the increasing trend of firms seeking equity aboard
via foreign and global IPOs. They seek to explain the reasons why firms partake in
such capital raising activities and suggest three main motivations. First, they
suggest that by partaking in a foreign or global IPO firms can reduce information
asymmetry problems associated with typical capital raising efforts domestically.
Their study suggests that foreign and global IPOs come from countries where
information asymmetries are likely high. Second, they find strong evidence that
foreign and global IPOs originate from countries whose security market is less
developed consistent with the bonding hypothesis developed by Coffee (2002).
Both points suggested by Caglio, et al. (20111) seem to neglect the upward trend of
U.S. firms bypassing U.S. equity markets in search of capital.
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Hypotheses
We hypothesize that foreign IPOs will experience less underpricing than their
domestic counterparts. IPOs have no prior trading history before going public and
therefore, the degree of information asymmetry between listing company and
investors is likely to be high. As in Wu and Kwok (2003) we suggest that underpricing
is reduced when firms seek equity financing from abroaddue to the foreign clientele
effect. The foreign clientele hypothesis suggests foreign clientele are willing to pay
higher prices in exchange for the benefit and convenience of global diversification
provided by these offerings. Foreign investors are not restricted from purchasing
U.S. stocks on the U.S. market but carrying out such a transaction may carry additional
transactional costs and deadweight costs such as information acquisition. Further,
purchasing a U.S. IPO on the U.S. market by a foreign investor is very difficult due
to the underwriter allocation of shares to preferred clientele.
H1: Foreign IPOs will experience no difference in underpricing from domestic
IPOs
Wu and Kwok (2003) find that global IPOs (by U.S. firms) can significantly reduce
underpricing by about 4 percentage points relative to purely domestic issues and
underpricing is found to be a decreasing function of the relative size of the global
tranche. They attribute the part of the lower underpricing to what they call “the
window of opportunity” hypothesis. This hypothesis follows the Ritter (1991) and
Loughran and Ritter (1995) studies which suggests that investors (individual and
institutional) are overly optimistic about the earnings potential of the new public
company and thus the underwriter sets the offering price relatively high leading
to less underpricing.Foreign investor’s interest in U.S. shares is not only affected
by the fundamentals of the IPO firm, but also affected by other factors such as the
attractiveness of the U.S. market. Thus, we hypothesize that U.S. foreign IPOs will
experience less underpricing than their domestic counterparts when the U.S. market
outperforms the host countries equity market.
H2: Foreign IPOs will experience no difference in underpricing when the U.S.
domestic market is “hot”.
According to Carter and Manaster (1990) prestigious underwriters are less likely
to underwrite risky offering and could be more skilled at pricing their offerings
appropriately. Research by Johnston and Miller (1988), Michaely and Shaw (1994)
among others find that underpricing is inversely related to the rank of the lead
underwriter. Our focus on rank of the lead underwriter centers on how FIPO firms
are impacted by the use of prestigious underwriters.
H3: Foreign IPOs that are brought to market by more prestigious underwriters
will experience no difference in performance than those brought to market
with less prestigious underwriters.
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3. DATA
Before we get into the sources of the dataset we should clarify the definitions of
what a foreign and domestic IPO are for this study.
Follow ing Caglio, et al. (2011) the following definitions are applicable.

Domestic IPOs (DIPOs) are IPOs that go public in their home country but not
in any foreign country.
Foreign IPOs (FIPOs) are IPOs that go public in at least one foreign country
but not in their home country.
We use the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) New Issue database to collect
the complete sample of foreign IPOs (FIPOs) and domestic IPOs (DIPOs) of U.S.
firms from 2000 to 2011. The initial sample included 131 FIPO firms and 3954 DIPOs.
We exclude issues with unit and right offers, issues made by financial institutions
(SIC 60-67), regulated electricity and gas companies (SIC 491-494), closed ended
funds, and real estate investment trusts (REITs). To be included in our sample the
issuers must be available on the Bloomberg securities database or Centre for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database on the offering dates. We rely mainly
on the SDC database to collect the IPO information. The majority of firms’ offering
information such as offer price, proceeds, underwriter, etc. is collected from SDC
database.
However, it is noted that the SDC database contains substantial errors in firms’
number of shares outstanding.3 To mitigate such data error problem, we crossreference the Bloomberg database on shares issued and outstanding. First-day
trading prices as well as daily and monthly price data for a period of 3 years from
the IPO date are obtained via Bloomberg or CRSP. The final FIPO sample contains
77 firms while DIPO sample contains 1041.4 The number of FIPO offerings has
increased over time (see Figure 1A) and has significant growth (via percentage)
compared to DIPOs (see Figure 1B). Figure 2 details the FIPOs destination listing
market which particularly highlights the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) as popular alternatives for U.S. firms seeking to
issue equity.
The independent variables include a FIPO dummy variable, Size (measured
by market capitalization at the time of the IPO in $M USD), ranking of the lead
underwriter, age of the firm at time of the IPO and others that can be seen in Table
2. A distribution of FIPOs and DIPOs via issue year can be seen in Table 3. Summary
statistics of the 77 FIPO and 1041 DIPO firms are provided in panel of Table 4. We
can observe that FIPOs are generally smaller in size and younger when compared
to the full sample of DIPOs. Panels B & C of Table 4 further compare the summary

5006

�

Robert N. Killins and Peter V. Egly

statistics of the FIPO sample compared against the portfolio of matched DIPOs via
both issue year and size and the propensity score methodology. In both panels we
can observe the characteristics of the FIPOs and DIPOs become more similar on
several different measures. Size, Age, Rank, and the relevant run-up variables all
become much similar amongst the portfolios which will allow for much more robust
comparisons in regressions in the next sections.
Variable Descriptions
Underwriter Prestige (RANK)
According to Carter and Manaster (1990) prestigious underwriters are less likely
to underwrite risky offering and could be more skilled at pricing their offerings
appropriately. Research by Johnston and Miller (1988), Michaely and Shaw (1994)
among others find that underpricing is inversely related to RANK. Our focus on
RANK centers on how FIPO firms are impacted by the use of prestigious
underwriters compared to their domestic counterparts. In other words, does
choosing to go with a FIPO reduce the importance of the lead underwriter’s
prestige?
Venture Capital (VC)
Firms that are backed by venture capitalists can benefit from VC expertise or
monitoring (Brav and Gompers, 2003). Thus, there should be less uncertainty
surrounding the value, which would be reflected in a lower degree of underpricing.
Barry, Muscarella et al. (1990) empirically confirms this relation. VC firms although
are more likely to pursue investments that offer the potential for high returns, and
the demand for shares backed by VC can be stronger, which could cause a more
pronounced initial return unless additional shares are issued. Lastly, venture
capitalists can relinquish their control over time and could cause downward price
pressures in the aftermarket as they cash out (Field and Hanka, 2001).
Size
Larger offerings should be subject to more scrutiny by the market and could exhibit
less uncertainty than smaller offerings (Jegadeesh, Weinstein et al. 1993; Michaely
and Shaw 1994). However, larger offerings could create more sentiment and demand
on the first day of the offering, which could result in more pronounced initial returns.
Age
There could be more information available for older firms. Additional information
decreases uncertainty and subsequently underpricing.
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Exchange Type (VEX)
Whether a firm is listed on a venture exchange such as the AIM in London or the
TSX Venture in Toronto impacts the level and regulation of the firm’s information
disclosures. Thus, firms that are listed on the main exchanges (Big Boards) are
more likely to have increased information disclosure and thus lead to less
underpricing and more stable long run performance than those firms listed on the
venture exchanges.
Standard Deviation (STD 60)
The standard deviation in the first 60 days of trading is measured to determine the
level of trust the market participants have in the price of the offering. Lower levels
of STD60 indicate that the price of the offering has stabilized and market
participants generally agree on the value of the asset or stock. Thus, we hypothesize
that firms’ that exhibit lower levels of volatility will typically outperform firms’
with higher volatility in the long-run.
Standard Deviation (Market SD)
A firm’s aftermarket risk, when measured by the standard deviation of firm stock
returns, may be affected by the general volatility of the market during that time
period. We control for the market volatility by calculating the standard deviation
of the market. We measure this variable using the standard deviation of the Morgan
Stanley Capital International EAFE index from -90 to -1 prior to the offer date.
Run-Up (World and U.S)
When there is much favorable sentiment about market conditions firms tend to
chase these markets and typically try to time their offerings (Loughran and Ritter,
2002). Thus, we measure the “hotness” of the world and U.S. market and
hypothesize that when the world market is outperforming the U.S. market more
firms tend to look overseas and pursue a FIPO. Further, when the U.S. market is
performing well underpricing of FIPOs will be greater as investors overseas will
see U.S. firms as more valuable and drive up the initial day one IPO price.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
The SOX was enacted on July 30, 2002. Further, exemptions were put in place for
small firms which released them from the full obligations of SOX conformant. We
use a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is obligated to conform to the
regulations of SOX and 0 otherwise. We predict that firms’ would have more interest
in pursuing a FIPO if they are obligated to conform to the full regulations of SOX.
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4. METHODOLOGY
The main goal of this research is to determine whether foreign IPOs experience
different performance over the domestic IPO offering. We aim to capture over
(under) performance by comparing the FIPO and DIPO sample via overall sample
comparisons, traditional matching, and by propensity score methodology.
Traditional Matching
To begin matching we will use the traditional matching methodology that typically
employs two or three matching dimensions. Following Johnson and Madura (2009)
who match U.S. and Canadian IPOs, wewill use issue year and size as our two
dimensions for matching my FIPO and non-FIPO firms.5 To choose a match on
issue year and size for an FIPO firm, we first find all the firms that issue equity in
the same year. Limiting IPOs to a single year allows for greater homogeneity in
issuance conditions. From this set we select the firm that has a market capitalization
closest to that of the FIPO issue to be matched. A domestic IPO cannot be selected
more than once into the size-matched control sample. The short-term performance
results of the portfolio of DIPOs matched on size and issue year are used and
reported in both short-term comparisons of performance in the results.
Propensity Score Matching
We follow the methodology of Cheng (2003), Li and Zhao (2006) and others who
have previously used propensity score matching in determining performance
difference amongst firms who issue equity and those who do not. The matching
procedures in prior studies select the control firm based on how close it is to the
event firm in terms of two or three dimensions, e.g., industry, size. However, issuing
stock is an endogenous choice for the firm. There are potentially important factors,
other than industry and size underlying the decision.
The econometric theory behind the propensity score matching is the Propensity
Score Theorem established by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Consider a treatment
group and a non-treatment control group. Let P(X ) be the probability of having
been assigned to treatment, with X being a vector of independent variables. P(X )
is the so-called propensity score. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) observe that when
non-treatment outcomes are independent of program participation conditional
on X , they are also independent of participation conditional on P(X ) . That is, a
match can be found for the treated unit based on the probability of participation,
P(X ) , instead of X directly. The treatment effect can then be computed as averaging
the conditional effect over the propensity score distribution in the treated group.
In the context of FIPO firms, it can written as:
�|S=1 = E P(x) [{E(Ri1,l |P(Xi), Si =1) – E (Ri0,l |P(Xi), Si =0)} |Si =1],

(1)
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Propensity score matching provides a way to greatly reduce the dimensionality
of the matching problem. According to the Propensity Score Theorem, finding the
match for an FIPO firm based on a vector of characteristics is equivalent to finding
the match based on the probability of equity offering conditional on the vector of
firm characteristics. Thus, the problem reduces to matching the FIPO and nonFIPO firms along their conditional probability of issuing equities, a scalar variable
that can be estimated from an empirical model. Moreover, because we are able to
incorporate all the relevant characteristics of the firms in the empirical model, we
maximize comparability between the FIPO firm and its match.
In implementing the propensity score matching, an empirical model has to be
specified to derive the propensity score. Next subsection discusses the logit model
of foreign equity offering decision conditional on the firms’ characteristics. Another
necessary condition is that for an FIPO firm, there should be positive probability
of finding a match from the non-FIPO group based on the propensity score. As we
will see there is sufficient overlapping in the propensity score distributions between
FIPO and non-FIPO firms, thus the above necessary condition is satisfied.
Consistent with the algorithm developed in the Dehejia and Wahba (1999), the
steps of propensity score matching in this paper are as following:
Step1: Choose the controlling variables to maximize correct classification rate and
estimate the resulting foreign equity issuance model by logistic regression.
Step 2: Derive the predicted probability of issuing equities for both FIPO and nonFIPO firms, i.e., propensity scores, based on the parameters estimated in Step 1.
Step 3: For any FIPO firm, find the non-FIPO firm in the same year with the closest
propensity score as the match. This is the so-called “nearest-neighbor-match”. Note
that this step matches the firms with replacement. To ensure the match’s propensity
score is close enough for every FIPO firm, the propensity score distribution of the nonFIPO firms needs to have substantial overlapping with that of the FIPO firms, which is
indeed the case as discussed later.

In Step 1, we are able to incorporate a large set of potentially relevant firm
characteristics which includes all the variables described above in the data section.
Compared to the standard two dimension matching, this approach allows one to
match the firms on multiple important factors; therefore, more closely matched
control firms are provided.
5. RESULTS
Estimation of the Logit Model
Table 5 presents the results of the logit analysis which models the firm’s equity
offering decision (Domestic or Foreign), incorporating the independent variables
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as discussed in previous sections, including, the rank of the lead underwriter
(RANK)6, age of the firm in log days (AGE), market capitalization (SIZE), (VC)
dummy variable that equals one if the offering is backed by a venture capitalist
and zero if it was not, (WRDRUNUP) measures the run-up in the world market
one year prior to the IPO date, (USRUNUP) measures the run-up of the US market
one year prior to the IPO date and a SOX dummy variable that indicates one if the
firm is subject to SOX regulations or 0 if the firm is not. The dependent variable is
1 if a firmissues equities overseas (FIPO) and 0 otherwise. We estimate the model
over thetotal sample between the years 2000 and 2011.
The total observations included in the model were 1118, which included 77
FIPOs and 1041 DIPOs. The model fit statistics such as Likelihood ratio, Score, and
Wald tests all indicate that the model does have predicting power. The chi-square
results all indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis, in favour of the alternative
hypothesis, that at least one of the predictors’ regression coefficients is not equal
to zero in the model. Further, the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit (GOF)
test is a way to assess whether there is evidence of lack of fit in a logistic regression
model. With a Chi-square of 8.4521 and a Pr> Chi Square of 0.2358 we are unable
to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that this model is acceptable. In other
words, the statistically insignificant Chi-square measure suggests no material
difference in the distribution of the actual and predicted dependent values which
implies good model fit.
Next we will turn to the predicting variables. Out of the 7 predicting variables
we have included in the logistic regression 5 are found to be significant. Only size
and age which show -0.0089 and -0.1584 estimates are not significant. Both of the
above mentioned variables have a negative coefficient which suggests that as the
size and age of firms may opt towards a DIPO rather than pursuing equity overseas
but again these results do not show statistical significance. The five variables that
do show statistical significance include RANK, VC, USRUNUP, WRDRUNUP,
and SOX. Interestingly, four out of the five variables show positive coefficients.
The rank of the lead underwriter shows the only negative coefficient of -0.154
indicating that firms choosing lesser ranked lead underwriters may tend to be
more willing to venture overseas to equity markets outside of their own. With an
odds ratio of 0.8572this suggests that a one unit increase in the rank of the lead
underwriter, the odds for a FIPO is expected to decrease by 14.28 percent, given
that all other variables are held constant.
Originally, our hypothesis was that firms that go overseas would tend to obtain
higher ranked lead underwriter which would provide them with more experience
and operations overseas that may accommodate firms that are venturing outside
of the U.S. But the negative and significant coefficient shows that firms venturing
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overseas obtain lesser ranked lead underwriters. One possible explanation may
be that firms going overseas are more economical in their choices of underwriters
and prefer lesser ranker, cheaper alternatives. The VC variable that indicates
whether the firm has venture capital backing shows a significant and positive
coefficient of 0.340. The odds ratio of 1.404 indicates that for venture capitalist
backed firms the likelihood of pursuing a FIPO increases by 40.4 percent.
This result has some interesting possible explanations. First, firms that have
VC backing could have VCs that exhibit expertise in overseas markets or may
have had previous experience in FIPOs which could lead to some firms being
more comfortable in pursuing equity overseas. The second interpretation of this
finding could be that the firm backed by the VCs may have difficulty going through
the U.S. equity market regulations (SOX, etc.) and these VCs may be eager to cash
out of these firms for some reason. Hence, the VC push the firm to pursue a FIPO,
bypassing the U.S. regulations, leading to a faster more cost effective way allowing
VCs to cash in their shares.
The two measures of stock market run-ups, USRUNUP and WRDRUNUP, both
indicate positive and significant coefficients. The U.S. market run-up variable
indicates that it has more influence in the decision to pursue a FIPO with a
coefficient and odds ratio of 0.165 and 1.179 respectively compared to the world
market run-up variable with a coefficient of 0.065 and 1.067. Both variables indicate
that as the market (both in the U.S. and World) heat up firms from the U.S. are
more likely to pursue a FIPO. This result is consistent with Wu and Kwok (2003,
2007) which find that firms may pursue global IPOs in periods of positive stock
market returns. Additionally this may add some additional support to the popular
market timing hypothesis.
Lastly, the SOX variable that indicates whether the firm would be subject to
SOX regulations shows a positive and significant estimate of 0.138 and an odds
ratio of 1.147 which suggest that firms that are exempt under the small-firm
exemption are more likely to pursue a FIPO. This is an interesting result as we first
hypothesized that firms that are not subject to SOX and fall under the small-firm
exemption are more likely to pursue a domestic IPO as they are not burdened by
costly and time consuming SOX regulations. A possible explanation to this result
could be that firms that are exempt originally when filing may still fear that new
regulations may be imposed on them in the future and hence firms continue to
pursue overseas equity via a FIPO.
After the logit model was estimated the propensity score are derived using the
estimated parameters. Figure 3 plots the distribution of the propensity scores in
both groups. As expected, the FIPO firms tend to have more weight on larger
propensity scores than the non-FIPO firms. Still, these two groups have substantial

5012

�

Robert N. Killins and Peter V. Egly

overlapping across the distributions. This provides a good base for matching
H eckman, Ichimura et al. (1997): if these two groups’ propensity score distributions
do not overlap with each other, it will be difficult to find a control firm with similar
propensity score for an FIPO firm.
Local optimal algorithms, often called “greedy” algorithms, are methods that
make optimal decisions at each step without attempting to make the best overall
(global) decision. Both the treatment and control units are first randomly sorted.
Then the first treated unit is selected to find its closet control match based on the
absolute value of the difference between their propensity scores. The closest control
unit is selected as a match. This procedure is repeated for all treated units. Therefore
based on this, for any FIPO firm, we find the non-FIPO firm with the closest
propensity score as the match. This is the so-called “nearest-neighbor-match”. Note
that this step matches the firms withreplacement. We are able to match all 77 FIPOs
in oursample via the “nearest neighbor” methodology7.
Univariate Methodology and Results
The goal of this study is to investigate whether foreign offerings are priced
differently than purely domestic IPOs. Following Wu and Kwok (2003), which
investigated the short-run underpricing of global IPOs we define underpricing as,
(P1- P0) / P-0

(2)

where P0 is the final offer price and P1 is the first after-market close price taken from
Bloomberg or CRSP. Refer to Table 6 for underpricing of foreign and domestic IPOs.
Table 6 presents the mean underpricing for the entire sample of FIPOs and
DIPOs, matched FIPOs and DIPOs based on traditional matching methodology
and matched FIPOs based on propensity score matching. FIPOs experience less
underpricing compared to domestic IPOs in testing of the entire sample and via
both matching methodologies. The full sample of FIPOs are underpriced during
the 2000-2011 period by an average of 8.79% as opposed to DIPOs which are
underpriced by an average of 11.89%. This difference shows to be significant via
both t-test and non-parametric tests. When we implement the traditional matching
method of IPOs via offering year and size the underpricing of the DIPO sample
does fall to 10.59% but is still significantly higher than the FIPO sample consistent
at 8.79%. Finally, when matching via propensity score the underpricing of the
DIPO sample now falls to 10.08% compared to the FIPO sample of 8.79% and shows
significance when testing the difference in means. Therefore, via univariate testing
we can reject the null hypothesis in H1 and conclude that FIPOs do exhibit less
underpricing when compared to DIPOs via full sample and matching
methodologies.
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Table 1
Selecting Criteria

Number of FIPO Number of
Observations
Domestic IPO
Observations

1. FIPOs between 2000 and 2011 as recorded via SDC
1, & 2. Exclude issues with unit and right
offers, issues by financial institutions (SIC 60-67),
regulatory electricity and gas companies
(SIC 491-494), closed-ended funds and real
estate investments (REITS).
1, 2, & 3. With necessary price data on
Bloomberg or CRSP
1, 2, 3 & 4. Available Data obtained via Ritter
Website, Thompson One Banker or able to
hand-collect. (Underwriter Ranking, VC backing, Age)

143
117

3954
3455

93

2620

77

1041

Table 2
Independent Variables

Source and Computation

Foreign Dummy (FD)
Size - Market Cap. (MC)
Rank of Lead Underwriter (RANK)
Age of Firm (At time of IPO) (AGE)

1=FIPO 0=Domestic IPO
SDC Database
SDC Database & Jay Ritter Website (Rankings) 9
Via Jay Ritter Website or Hand-Collected via
firms website10 Log # of Days from Founding
Date to Offer Date
1=Backed by VC 0=Not Backed by VC
(Thompson One Banker)

Venture Capital Backing Dummy (VC)
Big Board or Venture Exchange
Dummy (VEX)
Standard Deviation of first 60 days (STD60)
US Market Run-Up (USMR)

SOX (SOX)
Millis Ratio (MR)

1=Venture Exchange 0=Main Exchange (SDC)
Bloomberg/CRSP Daily Price Data
CRSP Equal-weighted Index- One Year RunUp prior to IPO
MSCI World Market Index - One Year RunUp prior to IPO
90 day standard deviation MSCI World
Market
1=Exempt from SOX 0=Not exempt from SOX
Via Logit/Heckman Self-Selection Model

Dependent Variables

Source of Data

Underpricing (UP)
Logit Regression (LoPro)

Bloomberg
Via Results

Additional Data
CRSP Value and Equal Weighted Index

CRSP

World Market Run-Up (WRDMR)
Market Standard Deviation
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Table 3
Distribution of sample firms by calendar year

Year

FIPO

DIPO

2000

1

212

2001

2

62

2002

3

54

2003

0

41

2004

4

123

2005

14

132

2006

11

109

2007

21

116

2008

3

18

2009

5

34

2010

8

71

2011

5

69

Total

77

1041

Table 4
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample
FIPO
N=77
SIZE
AGE
RANK
STD60
USRUNUP
WRDRUP
MarketSD

DIPO
Mean

STD

Median

88.75
7.26
6.45
0.045
1.49%
0.49%
.019

61.21
2.56
2.65
0.038
12.45%
6.19%
.011

69.52
7.01
6.70
.051
1.56%
.32%
.026

N=1041

Mean

STD

Median

119.71
8.12
7.17
0.039
1.21%
-0.21%
.022

103.81
3.85
2.19
0.031
11.71%
7.2%
.012

103.41
7.96
7.50
0.044
1.54%
-0.06%
.018

Mean

STD

Median

95.12
8.33
7.04
0.049
1.13%
0.21%
0.014

56.34
3.12
2.11
0.042
10.98%
6.87%
0.01

86.23
7.75
7.14
0.059
1.45%
0.35%
0.02%

Panel B: Matched via Issue Year and Size
FIPO
N=77
SIZE
AGE
RANK
STD60
USRUNUP
WRDRUP
MarketSD

Mean

STD

Median

88.75
7.26
6.45
0.045
1.49%
0.49%
0.019

61.21
2.56
2.65
0.038
12.45%
6.19%
0.011

69.52
7.01
6.75
0.051
1.56%
0.32%
0.026

DIPO
N=77
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Panel C: Matched via Propensity Score
FIPO
N=77
SIZE
AGE
RANK
STD60
USRUNUP
WRDRUP
MarketSD

Mean

STD

Median

88.75
7.26
6.45
0.045
1.49%
0.49%
0.019

61.21
2.56
2.65
0.038
12.45%
6.19%
0.011

69.52
7.01
6.75
0.051
1.56%
0.32%
0.026

DIPO
N=77

Mean

STD

Median

101.23
7.89
6.87
0.037
1.31%
0.43%
0.013

68.97
2.67
2.01
0.031
11.31%
6.11%
0.009

93.21
7.31
7.01
0.043
1.54%
0.39%
0.028

Firm size (SIZE) is the market capitalization ($million) calculated at the offer price. Age of firm
(AGE) is the log number of days that the firm has been existence prior to the IPO. Rank of lead
underwriter (RANK) is borrowed from Carter et al. (2007) and updated by Loughran and Ritter
(2004). Venture Capital (VC) backing is represented by a dummy variable; 1 indicated backing
by a VC and 0 if not. VEX is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on a venture
exchange and zero if not. STD60 represents the standard deviation of the first 60 daily returns
taken from Bloomberg after the offering. US stock market run-up (USRUNUP) is measured as
the cumulative abnormal market return from -365 to -2 relative to the average CRSP equally
weighted market return prior to the offer date. Non-US world market run (WRDRUNUP) is
defined as the cumulative abnormal return of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE
index from -365 to -2 prior to the offer date. Market standard deviation (MarketSD) is the
standard deviation of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE index from -90 to -2
prior to the offer date. SOX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was not exempt of SOX
regulations at the time of the IPO and 0 if it was exempt.

This result could potentially be explained via the asymmetric information
theory. Since FIPOs enter into a brand new market place outside of their home
country these firms may have to provide an abundant amount of information in
order for investors to feel comfortable in investing in their shares. With the
additional amount of information provided, investors now have information to
properly evaluate the assets and cash-flow of the potential FIPO and hence will
not overspend on the offering on the initial day of trading. Next, we will present
the multivariate investigation of the short-term underpricing to further test the
aforementioned hypotheses.
Multivariate Regressions of Underpricing
We use the following regression to examine the cross-sectional differences in
underpricing between the foreign compared to the domestic sample.
UPi= � + �Ii + �Wi + �i,

(3)

where UPi is the underpricing defined in (1), Ii is the foreign offering indicator
variable that equals one for foreign issues and zero otherwise, and W i represents a
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Table 5
Propensity Score Model Coefficient Estimates

Variables

Estimate

Chi-square

Pr> Chi Square

Odds Ratio

Constant
Size
Age
Rank
VC
USRUNUP
WRDRUNUP
SOX
Likelihood Ratio

0.18
-0.0089
-0.1584
-0.154
0.34
0.165
0.065
0.138
141.459
(<.001)
139.876
(<.001)
13.5461
(<.001)
31%

4.1245
1.2148
1.5489
10.5471
8.8952
7.4568
4.2341
5.2156

0.0154
0.3214
0.2091
0.0001
0.0003
0.0009
0.0198
0.0091

0.9911
0.8535
0.8572*
1.404*
1.179*
1.067*
1.147*

8.4521

0.2358

Score Test
Wald Test
Pseudo R2
Homer/Lemeshow
GOF

Odds ratio represent the increase in the odds (the probability of pursuing a FIPO over the
probability of pursuing DIPO) when the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. Significance is
indicated by * if the 95% Wald Confidence Limits do not contain an odds ratio (OR) of 1 which
implies an equal probability of an event occurring (pursuing a FIPO) vs. not occurring
(probability of pursuing a DIPO instead of a FIPO).
Table 6
First-day returns for FIPO & DIPO sample
Panel A: Full Sample
N
Underpricing %

FIPO

DIPO

Difference (t-test)

77
8.79%

1041
11.89%

3.10% (3.562)**

FIPO

DIPO

Difference (t-test)

77
8.79%

77
10.59%

1.80% (2.239)**

FIPO

DIPO

Difference (t-test)

77
8.79%

77
10.98%

1.89% (2.318)**

Panel B: Matched via offering year and size
N
Underpricing %

Panel C: Matched via Propensity Score
N
Underpricing %

*Underpricing is measured as (P1- P0) / P-0, where P0 is the final offer price and P1 is the first
after-market close price taken from Bloomberg or CRSP.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level in the t-test difference of means
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vector of explanatory variables that are related to underpricing. The explanatory
variables include the following: Firm size is the log of market capitalization
calculated at the offering date. Age as measured by the log of the number of days
from founding date to offer date. Rank of the lead underwriter is the rank used
developed by Carter, et al. (1998) and later updated and modified by Loughran
and Ritter (2004) which assigns integers from 0 (lowest) to 9 (highest). VC Dummy
equals one if the firm was backed by a venture capitalist and zero if it was not. A
dummy variable which equals one if the firm is listed on a venture exchange and
zero if not. STD60 represents the standard deviation of the first 60 daily returns
taken from Bloomberg after the offering. Market standard deviation (MarketSD)
is the standard deviation of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE index
from -90 to -2 prior to the offer date. U.S. stock market run-up (USRUNUP) is
measured as the cumulative abnormal return of the CRSP equally weighted market
from -365 to -2 prior to the offer date. Non-US world market run (WRDRUNUP) is
the cumulative abnormal return of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE
index from -365 to -2 prior to the offer date.
Table 7 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results from the
above specifications of equation (3). In all regressions, the standard errors for the
coefficient estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980)
procedure. In the first regression, the independent variables are the log of market
capitalization, the log number of days of the firm from founding date to issue
date, rank of the lead underwriter, venture capital backed dummy, venture
exchange listed dummy, and the first 60 days trading price standard deviation.
The foreign dummy variable in the first regression shows a coefficient of -0.034
with a t-value of -1.817, suggesting that FIPOs have significantly lower underpricing
(at 10%) than purely domestic offerings. The size variable (measured by market
capitalization) shows a positive and significant coefficient of 0.198. This indicates
that as the size of the firm increases the underpricing of the IPO increases. This is
consistent with previous results and is typically explained by larger offering gaining
increased interest (via media) closer to the offer date and market participants
driving up the price on day one of trading. The venture exchange dummy (VEX)
also indicates that firms listing on venture exchanges experience more underpricing.
With a coefficient of 0.058 firms listed on venture exchanges experience 5.8% times
more underpricing than firms who list on the main exchange. This result is logical
and can be explained by the asymmetric information theory described earlier. Since
firms listing on venture exchanges are not held to the same listing standards as
firms listing on the major exchanges, these firms may be riskier and information
provided by the listing firm prior to the listing may not be equivalent to that of a
firm listing on a major exchange. This could potentially result in venture exchange
listed firms pricing their offer price much lower in order to compensate investors

5018

�

Robert N. Killins and Peter V. Egly

Table 7
Cross-sectional regressions of IPO underpricing (Dependent Variable is Underpricing)
Independent Variables
Constant
FD
SIZE
AGE
RANK
VC
VEX
STD60

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.234
[-4.786]***
-0.034
[-1.817]*
0.198
[2.051]**
-0.041
[-1.167]
-0.011
[-0.987]
0.062
[1.456]
0.058
[3.987]***
1.345
[2.017]**

-0.198
[-4.897]***
-0.031
[-1.796]*
0.202
[2.102]**
-0.04
[-1.123]
-0.015
[-1.098]
0.057
[1.423]
0.054
[3.883]***
1.407
[2.123]**
0.0032
[1.771]*
0.0017
[1.459]
0.022
[2.89]**

0.19
29.23***

0.16
13.67***

-0.281
[-4.678]***
-0.029
[-1.762]*
0.208
[2.112]**
-0.038
[-1.098]
-0.013
[-1.001]
0.043
[1.398]
0.052
[3.872]***
1.401
[2.112]**
0.003
[1.732]*
0.0014
[1.234]
0.027
[2.92]**
0.033
[0.678]
0.15
9.34***

USRUNUP
WRDRUNUP
MarketSD
SOX
ADJ. R2
F STATISTIC

*Indicates significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
The sample contains 77 foreign IPOs (FIPO) and 1041 Domestic IPOs made by US industrial
firms from 2000-2011. FD represents whether the firm is a FIPO and takes a value of 1 if so and
0 if it is not. Firm size (SIZE) is the market capitalization ($million) calculated at the offer price.
Age of firm (AGE) is the log number of days that the firm has been existence prior to the IPO.
Venture Capital (VC) backing is represented by a dummy variable; 1 indicated backing by a
VC and 0 if not. VEX is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on a venture exchange
and zero if not. STD60 represents the standard deviation of the first 60 daily returns taken from
Bloomberg after the offering. Rank of lead underwriter (RANK) is borrowed from Carter et al.
(2007) and updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). US stock market run-up (USRUNUP) is
measured as the cumulative abnormal market return from -365 to -2 relative to the average
CRSP equally weighted market return prior to the offer date. Non-US world market run
(WRDRUNUP) is defined as the cumulative abnormal return of the Morgan Stanley Capital
International EAFE index from -365 to -2 prior to the offer date. Market standard deviation
(MarketSD) is the standard deviation of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE index
from -90 to -2 prior to the offer date. SOX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was exempt
of SOX regulations at the time of the IPO and 0 if it was exempt (small-exclusion).
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for the uncertainty of information and hence the riskier asset resulting in higher
first day price movements.
The variable STD60 which refers to the standard deviation of the first 60 days
of trading of the issue indicates a positive and significant coefficient of 1.345.
Indicating that firms that experience more volatility in the short-term experience
more significant underpricing. Finally, age of the firm prior to the issue date (AGE)
and main underwriters ranking (RANK) both show negative coefficients indicating
that as the firm becomes more mature in age prior to issuing equity and those
hiring a well ranked underwriter experience less underpricing. It should be noted
that both of these variable do not show statistical significance.
In regression (2), we add three market run-up variables that describe the general
market conditions that might affect the demand for U.S. based firms: (1) US Market
Run-Up, (2) World Market Run-up, (3) Standard deviation of the world market
prior to the IPO offering. Following Wu and Kwok (2003) we presume that when
the U.S. market is hot, foreign demand for a U.S. firm may rise thus providing
additional buying pressure on day 1 of trading leading to more significant
underpricing. After adding these additional variables the coefficient on the FIPO
indicator is -0.031 with a significant t-statistic of -1.796. This result shows that
FIPOs still exhibit less underpricing but with diminishing statistical significance.
The U.S. run-up measure shows a positive coefficient of 0.0032 which is statistically
significant at the 10% level. This result allows us to reject the null hypothesis in
H2 and indicates that when the U.S. market exhibits strong performance prior to
the IPO date the overall underpricing of IPOs are increased, which is consistent
with previous literature.
Finally, in the last regression we add a SOX dummy variable to investigate
whether firms that are exempt under the small-firm exemption clause of SOX
experience different underpricing as oppose to those firms who have to comply
fully with SOX. The coefficient of 0.033 with a t-value of 0.678 indicates that the
impact of the small-firm exemption does not affect the underpricing of this sample
of firms issuing equity.8
Next, to further investigate what influence the FIPO underpricing we run
another regression on only the sample of FIPOs. The dependent variable in the
regression will now be the difference between FIPOiunderpricing and its matched
DIPO via both the size and issue year criterion and the propensity score matched
method. Table 8 presents the regression results of the FIPO sample matched via
size and issue year. Table 9 presents the regression results of the FIPO sample
matched via propensity score. Using the same set of explanatory variables (minus
the foreign dummy) we can observe that some interesting results have populated.
First, in both Tables 8 & 9, the size coefficient (SIZE) has turned negative and
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Table 8
Cross-sectional regressions of FIPO underpricing
(Dependent Variable is FIPOiUP – DIPOmatchedUP) *Matched via Issue Year and Size
Independent Variables
Constant
SIZE
AGE
RANK
VC
VEX
STD60

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.132
[-2.973]**
-0.013
[-2.341]**
0.019
[1.129]
-0.007
[-0.893]
-0.011
[-1.893]*
0.013
[2.672]**
0.432
[1.668]

-0.139
[-2.995]**
-0.011
[-2.217]**
-0.017
[1.018]
-0.008
[-0.783]
-0.009
[-1.743]
0.012
[2.557]**
0.39
[1.588]
-0.012
-[2.216]**
-0.008
-[1.658]
0.013
[1.215]

0.14
18.39***

0.11
14.12***

-0.148
[-3.127]**
-0.011
[-2.164]**
-0.016
[1.002]
-0.007
[-0.721]
-0.008
[-1.697]
0.012
[2.513]**
0.391
[1.603]
-0.009
[-1.963]**
-0.006
[-1.321]
0.011
[1.156]
-0.019
[-0.765]
0.09
8.98***

USRUNUP
WRDRUNUP
MarketSD
SOX

ADJ. R2
F STATISTIC

*Indicates significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
The sample contains 77 foreign IPOs (FIPO) made by US industrial firms from 2000-2011. Firm
size (SIZE) is the market capitalization ($million) calculated at the offer price. Age of firm (AGE)
is the log number of days that the firm has been existence prior to the IPO. Venture Capital
(VC) backing is represented by a dummy variable; 1 indicated backing by a VC and 0 if not.
VEX is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on a venture exchange and zero if
not. STD60 represents the standard deviation of the first 60 daily returns taken from Bloomberg
after the offering. Rank of lead underwriter (RANK) is borrowed from Carter et al. (2007) and
updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). US stock market run-up (USRUNUP) is measured as
the cumulative abnormal market return from -365 to -2 relative to the average CRSP equally
weighted market return prior to the offer date. Non-US world market run (WRDRUNUP) is
defined as the cumulative abnormal return from -60 to -2 relative to the average market returns
of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE index from -365 to -2 prior to the offer date.
Market standard deviation (MarketSD) is the standard deviation of the Morgan Stanley Capital
International EAFE index from -90 to -2 prior to the offer date. SOX is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the firm was exempt of SOX regulations at the time of the IPO and 0 if it was not exempt
(small-exclusion).
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Table 9
Cross-sectional regressions of FIPO underpricing
(Dependent Variable is FIPOiUP – DIPOmatchedUP) *Matched via Propensity Score
Independent Variables
Constant
SIZE
AGE
RANK
VC
VEX
STD60

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.121
[-2.339]**
-0.009
[-1.981]**
0.011
[1.117]
0.004
[0.567]
-0.017
[-2.109]**
0.009
[2.012]**
0.548
[1.017]

-0.106
[-2.293]**
-0.006
[-1.916]**
0.01
[1.098]
0.008
[0.679]
-0.015
[-2.023]**
0.008
[1.919]*
0.498
[0.987]
-0.009
[-1.921]*
0.002
[0.458]
0.006
[0.897]

0.12
16.12***

0.09
11.78***

-0.098
[-2.214]**
-0.005
[-1.845]*
0.01
[1.012]
0.006
[0.598]
-0.014
[-1.932]*
0.008
[1.897]*
0.477
[0.872]
-0.008
-[1.871]*
-0.001
[-0.213]
0.005
[0.843]
-0.009
[-0.617]
0.07
7.12***

USRUNUP
WRDRUNUP
MarketSD
SOX

ADJ. R2
F STATISTIC

*Indicates significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
The sample contains 77 foreign IPOs (FIPO). Firm size (SIZE) is the market capitalization
($million) calculated at the offer price. Age of firm (AGE) is the log number of days that the
firm has been existence prior to the IPOVenture Capital (VC) backing is represented by a dummy
variable; 1 indicated backing by a VC and 0 if not. VEX is a dummy variable equal to one if the
firm is listed on a venture exchange and zero if not. STD60 represents the standard deviation of
the first 60 daily returns taken from Bloomberg after the offering. Rank of lead underwriter
(RANK) is borrowed from Carter et al. (2007) and updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). US
stock market run-up (USRUNUP) is measured as the cumulative abnormal market return from
-365 to -2 relative to the average CRSP equally weighted market return prior to the offer date.
Non-US world market run (WRDRUNUP) is defined as the cumulative abnormal return from
-60 to -2 relative to the average market returns of the Morgan Stanley Capital International
EAFE index from -365 to -2 prior to the offer date. Market standard deviation (MarketSD) is the
standard deviation of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE index from -90 to -2
prior to the offer date. SOX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was exempt of SOX
regulations at the time of the IPO and 0 if it was exempt (small-exclusion).
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Figure 1A: Number of FIPOs over 2000-2011

Figure 1B: Number of DIPOs over 2000-2011
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Figure 2: FIPO Listing Destinations

Figure 3 - Propensity score distribution of FIPO and DIPO (non-FIPO) firms
This graph plots the propensity score distribution of FIPO and non-FIPO (DIPO) firms.
The propensity score is derived from the logit model estimation between
2000 and 2011 in Table 5.
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significant across all models. The coefficient of -0.013 in Table 8 suggests for a one
unit change in size the degree of underpricing a FIPO realizes compared to its
DIPO match decreases by 1.3%. Therefore, larger FIPOs will experience less
underpricing than smaller FIPOs in general. This result could potentially be
attributed to larger issuers having more foreign clientele familiar with their already
existing firm and less information asymmetries resulting in better initial pricing.
Secondly, FIPO firms that has venture capital backing prior to their IPO
experience less underpricing which is suggested by the coefficient of-0.011 in the
first regression in Table 8. Venture capitalists may have existing relationships
overseas or with underwriters which will provide issuers with the ability to better
price their initial offering. Firms that list via venture exchanges seem to experience
more underpricing which is consistent with previous results suggesting that firms
listed on venture exchanges will have to underprice their issues in order to
compensate investors for the riskier more uncertain cash-flows.
Finally, when adding the run-up variables in regressions (2) and (3) the U.S.
run-up variables again populates to indicate significance. With coefficients of 0.012 and -0.009 in table 8 and -0.009 and -0.008 in Table 9 this suggests that as the
U.S. stock market is “hot”, FIPOs will experience less underpricing by
approximately a percentage point. This again confirms the foreign clientele
hypothesis presented earlier suggesting that when the U.S. market is “hot” foreign
investors will be willing to pay more for the issue resulting in proper allocation of
shares and less significant underpricing on day 1.
6. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to examine the performance of U.S. based private firms
which decide to bypass the U.S. capital markets in search of a public equity issuance
overseas. Recent literature suggests that with the globalization of equity markets
and increased international competitiveness among exchanges the United States
financial exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) may be losing its place as the premier
destination to list. Globalized competition among exchanges has led to the increased
development of global IPOs. Zingales (2007) finds that while in the late 1990s the
U.S. capital market was attracting 48% of all the global IPOs, its share has dropped
to 6% in 2005. Zingales (2007) also hints at the idea of U.S. based firms totally
bypassing the U.S. equity markets in favor of European markets but suggest that it
has only been a recently but surprisingly interesting phenomenon.
Zingales (2007) points out the new trend of bypassing U.S. markets are recent
and interesting and therefore little research has been conducted on this population
of firms. Wu and Kwok (2003, 2007) investigate the performance of U.S firms
pursuing global IPOs and Caglio, et al. (2011) investigate the determinants of
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domestic, global, and foreign IPOs, but the performance of U.S. firms pursuing
foreign IPOs has not been researched to this point. Therefore, this research provides
additional insight into the overall IPO literature and provides insight into the new
globalized market for initial public offerings. Further, this research fills a void
pointed out by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) which suggests much of the past
literature focuses its attention on investigating non-U.S. based firms issuing equity
on U.S. markets and lack investigations of U.S. firms pursuing capital elsewhere.
We found that the U.S. firms pursuing a foreign IPO experience less
underpricing than domestic IPO firms. This finding is robust when comparing the
full sample and when using matched portfolios. The foreign dummy (FD) variable
indicates a negative coefficient suggesting that FIPOs tend to experience less
underpricing. This result complements the finding in Wu and Kwok (2003) that
finds global IPOs to be less underpriced than purely domestic offerings.
Secondly, we follow on the Wu and Kwok (2003) finding and test the existence
of the foreign clientele effect which suggests that foreign clientele are willing to
pay higher prices for U.S. assets when the U.S. market is experiencing “hot”
conditions. The coefficient for U.S. run-up in the regression results shows support
for the foreign clientele hypothesis suggesting that when the U.S market is “hot”
investors seem to bid up the first day price leading to higher first-day returns.
Using rank of the lead underwriter as a control variable in the regressions, we
test the popular prestigious underwriters theory which suggests prestigious
underwriters are less likely to underwrite risky offerings and could be more skilled
at pricing their offerings appropriately.
Research by Johnston and Miller (1988), Michaely and Shaw (1994) among
others find that underpricing is inversely related to rank. While the coefficient in
the regression results does suggest an inverse relationship, consistent with previous
studies, it lacks statistical significance.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to investigate the performance
of U.S. firms bypassing the U.S. capital markets in pursuit of their initial equity
offering elsewhere. Previous studies by Caglio, et al. (2011) have investigated why
firms decide to pursue such equity issuances but fail to investigate the firms actual
performance after issuing equity. This research fills such gap in the literature and
is important for both academics and practitioners.
As more firm specific data becomes available a variety of different control
variables and theories can be tested on this sub-sample of IPOs. Practitioners can
use this information in assessing the quality of such investments in the short-run
and firms can utilize such information when determining the different options in
issuing initial equity.
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Notes
1.

“U.S. Falls behind in Stock Listings,” by Aaron Lucchetti, The New York Times, June 23,
2011, A1.

2.

SeeJay Ritter’s websitefor comprehensivesurvey of literature; http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/
ritter/

3.

The discussion of the data problem contained in the SDC database can be found at, http://
pages.stern.nyu.edu/~aljungjv/research.htm

4.

Refer to Table 1 for details on the selection criteria for our sample.

5.

Matching by industry is not done for several reasons as pointed out in Loughran and Ritter
(1995). First, if firms in an industry time their offers to take advantage of industry-wide
misevaluations controlling for industry effects this will reduce the ability to identify
abnormal performance. Second, there are frequently only a few IPOs in an industry with
approximately the same market capitalizations as the issuing firms, resulting in the same
DIPO being matched with numerous FIPOs.

6.

Following Wu and Kwok (2003) we measure the underwriter reputation developed by
Carter et al. (1998), revised by Ritter (2004) as a proxy for the rank of the lead underwriter
(the highest rank is 9 while the lowest is 0).

7.

Other methods of matching, e.g. Mahalanobis Metric Matching, Global Optimal Matching,
and caliper matching (via local optimal) may provide better matches but significantly reduce
the FIPO sample size.

8.

Additional tests for self-selection bias were conducted and results indicate that the empirical
findings that FIPOs are significantly less underpriced cannot be explained by self-selection
bias.

9.

Rank of the lead underwriter (RANK) is from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.
The highest rank is 9 while the lowest is 0.

10. The age the firm has been in existence prior to their IPO is obtained via http://
bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm or hand-collected via the firms’ website.
11. A firm can be exempt from SOX by either filing or executing an IPO prior to 2003 or via the
small firm exemption clause (see SOX section in Chapter 2 for more detail on SOX
exemptions).
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